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FOR CONSIDERATION

There Goes Our Tax \$\$

One of the inevitable conclusions that will be reached by the public, when and if Watergate is ever fully unraveled, is whether it is really worthwhile to spend so much of the public's hard-won money on certain government operations which were exposed as hopelessly corrupt or inefficient.

J. Edgar Hoover longed to live until the colossal new FBI headquarters was completed in Washington. He didn't make it. But now that it is about complete at a cost of tens of millions of dollars a lot of people who put up the dough will tend to wonder whether it is worth a tinker's dam. Hoover's sacrosanct strong-box was rifled of highly classified documents while he was still living, and his temporary successor was stupid enough to destroy, unread, files that might have further pinpointed Watergate guilt.

Then there's the CIA, which always has been a bit retarded. It has a new home outside of Washington which Washington (George, that is, who had three spies at most) could never have understood. It cost many millions, is regarded as more security-conscious than Fort Knox, is loaded with thousands of well-paid spies, programmers and oracles who divine what the clandestinely-gathered information really means, and many society fellows who are too proud to work for a living.

CIA fouled up the Bay of Pigs invasion, as a result of which we were nearly thrust into a thermonuclear war. It fouled up the overthrow of South Vietnam's President Diem. Now it is revealed that it violated its charter, went into the domestic spying business, and had its nutty hawkshaws searching through the files of Dr. Ellsberg's head shrinker.

Did a piece years ago about the CIA around the time Castro was demanding U. S. tractors as ransom for the poor Cuban slobbs he had rounded up in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The CIA public relations fellow accidentally ushered me too early into the office of the then director, pipe-smoking party-going Alan Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State (who was surprised that the world was stunned by Russia's Sputnik 1. John Foster Dulles asked, "Why is everybody getting so excited over a piece of iron in the sky?").

But, getting back to Alan Dulles, I was shown into his office prematurely. He was on the phone and plaintively asking somebody on the other end of the line, "But how much does a tractor cost?" He spoke in the voice of a man who had never seen a tractor.

Alan Dulles' pipe sputtered volcanic sparks at a reception he attended in Washington for Nikita Khrushchev, when the latter paid a visit to President Eisenhower. Khrushchev, who probably knew more about Dulles than Dulles himself did, cornered him at the reception, and suggested to him jovially that each big power fire half of its spies. "They're all double agent," Khrushchev said with a merry twinkle. "Why don't we just exchange such secrets as we've got, and save all that money?" Dulles was not amused.

Now if it comes out that the No. 2 man in the CIA okayed crazy red-wigged disguises and other cloak and dagger accessories to a couple of dumb operatives who had previously mangled other illegal acts. In addition, looking back 13 years, the CIA gave Francis Gary Powers the go-go-go signal to make a high altitude spy flight across the heart of the Soviet Union just days before Eisenhower was to go to the sensitive summit with Khrushchev. DeGaulle and MacMillan in Paris. Powers was shot down, Khrushchev bawled the hell out of Eisenhower, the summit collapsed, and Eisenhower's invitation to visit the USSR and cajole its 200 million people was abruptly withdrawn.

So why should we spend so much on an organization threaded so liberally with Keystone Kops?

Also, let's take another look at the decayed office of the Attorney General. And at the expensive digs of the President's - any president's - chief counsel. And the cost of maintaining (and wining and dining and retting) the stuffs that just about every president insists upon having around him, telling him how great he is - as we've seen with Truman's Gen. Harry Vaughan, Eisenhower's Sherman Adams, Johnson's Bobby Baker, and Nixon's covey of hawks.

Just think of the dough that could be saved and tunneled into decent, humanitarian and sorely-needed pursuits!

WHY "SPY" AGEI ARE BEING SHAK

Drastic changes are aimed at ending rivalries and improving the usefulness of U. S. intelligence. One result: Some inner workings are being disclosed.

The supersecret U. S. intelligence apparatus is being rocked from within on a scale never before so visible to the public.

What set off the tremor is a major overhaul, now in progress, of the machinery that produces the worldwide intelligence assessments on which crucial national decisions are based.

Under James R. Schlesinger, the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and overseer, also, of the vast U. S. information-gathering network—military as well as civilian—significant changes are being made. They have these objectives:

- To shake up the whole system and sharply improve its usefulness to the President and his top advisers.

- To process vital intelligence more effectively, at less cost.

Mr. Schlesinger cracked down on CIA, his home base, first. Now he is expected to focus on other parts of the intelligence community—military and civilian.

Payroll reductions. In the reorganization process, wholesale firings have occurred at the CIA—a cutback, sources say, of perhaps more than 1,000 of the agency's estimated 15,000 employes.

Some professionals assert that Mr. Schlesinger is bent on rooting out an "intellectually arrogant" clique that has been riding high in the CIA hierarchy for years.

Others counter that the chief purpose of the housecleanings is to enable the Nixon Administration to "politicize" the intelligence mechanism to its own ideological shape—and use Mr. Schlesinger to do it.

Both charges are vigorously denied by responsible people on all sides. Instead, the charges are cited as examples of the bitter bureaucratic infighting going on in Washington—and spreading into the intelligence system.

On one front, heated feuding between the CIA and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency—DIA—is out in the open.

Pentagon intelligence specialists, trying to regain control of assessing military threats to the U. S., are citing what they characterize as examples of blunders and bias by the CIA.

The military critics admit that their own mistakes a decade and more ago obliged the Government to turn to the civilian CIA for the main assessments on military threats. But now, the military men contend that DIA has been revamped, is more objective—and less of a lobby designed to scare Congress into voting higher defense budgets.

Against that background of turbulence, Mr. Schlesinger is moving to carry out the sweeping reorganization of the U. S. intelligence community originally ordered by President Nixon a year and a half ago—in November, 1971.


Knowledgeable sources say that Richard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, was replaced by Mr. Schlesinger as CIA Director because he failed to carry out the overhaul mandate to Mr. Nixon's satisfaction.

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what he calls the intelligence community staff, with offices on the top floor of the CIA headquarters building in a Virginia suburb of Washington.

Significantly, two military-intelligence

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE NETWORK AND WHAT IT DOES



James Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence, presides over the U.S. Intelligence Board, which sets intelligence requirements and priorities.

Represented on the board are—

The Central Intelligence Agency, top-secret Government organization, is responsible only to the White House, collects and evaluates intelligence information, plans clandestine missions abroad, conducts espionage and counterespionage.

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Domestic Spying Subverts Us all

By PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

Columbia, S.C.

Watergate began with a case of clumsy break-in and eavesdropping on the Democratic party headquarters during the last election. It reached a major watershed 10 months later when President Nixon "accepted the resignations" of two of his "closest and most trusted aides" on the White House staff and fired a third. On two occasions Mr. Nixon had flatly denied that the White House staff was in any way involved and his press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, had repeatedly branded press disclosures to the contrary as "not only fiction, but a collection of absurd lies." In his speech Monday, Mr. Nixon indicated that he placed greater credibility on the self-serving reassurances and repeated denials provided him by his own staff than in the wealth of information provided over the months by the press.

Thus Watergate highlights the bitter adversary relationship between the administration and the news media, a relationship frequently exacerbated by Vice President Agnew. Without the existence of what Mr. Nixon in his speech called "a vigorous free press" Watergate might have been decently buried and passed off as a minor although admittedly sordid incident in a heated election campaign. It is significant that Goebbels, the talented head of Nazi Germany's Information Ministry, described his agency's role with the colorful term *Massenmacherei*, which translates literally as "leading the masses astray." This was clearly Mr. Ziegler's strategy--a strategy of deception and denial--until the President's belated speech Monday.

Perhaps the closest espionage parallel to Watergate in recent American history is the U-2 affair. Under this intelli-

gence-collection program high-flying United States reconnaissance planes were secretly and successfully sent for years over the U.S.S.R. to collect extremely valuable military intelligence. The program had the highest priority and was approved by President Eisenhower. The story broke when one plane was shot down over Russia in the fall of 1960 on the eve of a scheduled summit meeting, providing Soviet Premier Khrushchev with a pretext for breaking off the meeting and indulging in moral fulminations against such "technological espionage" efforts. Although there is no evidence that Eisenhower knew of the last, unwise and ill-fated flight on the eve of the planned summit meeting, he took full personal responsibility. In his speech Monday, Mr. Nixon also accepted responsibility for the acts of "subordinates whose zeal exceeded their judgment." The parallel speaks for itself.

Two moral issues

Prior to election campaigns all parties seek to obtain as much biographical information or intelligence as possible about their opponents. The means used may be open or clandestine, as in Watergate. Washington columnist Jack Anderson wrote last Sunday that his "own White House sources say the President certainly did not authorize anyone to send a burglary-bugging team into the Democratic lair. But they acknowledge that he approved the overall espionage-sabotage operation." Only history will support or disprove Mr. Anderson's claims, but it is hardly open to serious question that as experienced a politician as Mr. Nixon didn't know that his party was collecting political intelligence on his opponent before and during the campaign.

The moral issues in Watergate thus narrow down to two:

- The means used to collect intelligence about opponents, a normal function of any party in a campaign;
- The use of deception and denial in public affairs as the story unfolded, indicating that immoral and illegal means -- wire-tapping, burglary, suppression of incriminating evidence and witnesses and the like -- had been used with or without the sanction of the White House staff and the President's closest advisers.

These are moral issues in themselves, quite independent of whether the President was "witting" (a favorite intelligence term) of the specific Watergate caper itself, which was only accidentally uncovered. And, of course, there is no reason to doubt the President's statement that he was "appalled by this senseless and illegal action" when he first heard about it in press accounts.

First, the question of means. In relation to Watergate, the question is whether collecting by illegal means information to which legal access is denied -- is a

universally recognized practice. It is defended on national security grounds -- that is, the nation is justified in using illegal means to assure its survival in a world of hostile or potentially hostile

states which may threaten its existence. Hence all nations employ clandestine intelligence services which secretly collect political and military intelligence by admittedly illegal and immoral means. However, within the state, in domestic political and other internal affairs, political or industrial espionage is not only condemned on moral grounds, but it is also illegal except for narrowly specified purposes and under carefully controlled conditions. Wiretapping, for example, is absolutely necessary in the fight against organized crime, particularly narcotics traffic but is carried on legally only under a specific court order and, with the approval of the attorney general.

It is axiomatic that the use of immoral means -- such typical clandestine techniques as bribery, blackmail, burglary and extortion -- tends to produce immoral people. This fact of life is recognized in a former CIA clandestine training manual that refers to it as "corruption by the tools of the trade," a wonderfully descriptive phrase. In Watergate, certain of the low-level agents involved probably learned clandestine intelligence techniques from this sub-standard manual, which has been available in a Spanish translation ever since the ill-fated Bay of Pigs fiasco.

The question of deception

Second, the question of deception. The arrogance of the former White House staff has been widely noted. Combined with the arrogance of power, deception in public affairs when used as a "tool of the trade" also tends to corrupt. The practice has been defended as the government's "right to know, to withhold and to lie," but the experience of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations indicates that the price of continuous or repeated deception in public affairs may be very high -- political alienation, the collapse of credibility and the undermining of faith in the institutions of government itself. Like violence, deception may be likened to an attractive but psychotic whore, who will sleep with any one of us, or all of us together, but in the end she will destroy us all.

In his Monday address, Mr. Nixon indicated that there was a lesson to be learned from Watergate, namely the need for reform of election practices. But there is another, far more important lesson that has become increasingly clear as additional details of what Mr. STATINTL "a series of illegal acts

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